In the recently approved House Armed Services Committee draft of the National Defense Authorization Act, members endorsed the establishment of a new branch within the US Army dedicated to drones.
This proposed Drone Corps would handle projects, programs, and activities related to small and medium unmanned aircraft, their supporting systems, and counter-UAS systems, among other responsibilities.
This proposal mirrors Ukraine’s creation of a dedicated drone force, showcasing the importance of drones on the battlefield. However, the US Army quickly dismissed the idea, arguing that a specialized drone branch may not be necessary at this time.
Undersecretary of the Army Gabe Camarillo emphasized that the challenge of “operating and defending against the drone threat” affects “all formations at multiple echelons.”
He believes a separate drone branch could disrupt ongoing efforts and slow down weapons acquisition. This reflects the broader tension between innovation and practicality within the military.
Similarly, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George, in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, argued against a separate drone branch, stating that drones should be integrated into “every formation, at every echelon.”
Despite the Army’s reservations, Congress’s proposal is forward-thinking. It acknowledges that military innovation often results from both technological and organizational changes. A new Drone Corps could drive such innovation by fostering specialization and competition within the Army’s otherwise monopolistic structure.
In the civilian sector, creative destruction drives progress, where new technologies replace outdated ones, compelling adaptation. Companies that fail to innovate, like Sears, fall behind, while those embracing change, like Amazon, thrive.
This principle should also apply to the military, which faces similar challenges of entrenched interests, bureaucracy, and risk aversion.
Gen. George’s assertion that everyone “owns” drones may lead to a tragedy of the commons, where a critical resource is overused but not adequately funded by any specific branch or formation.
The case for a dedicated drone operator branch is multifaceted. First, it promotes specialization and expertise in drone technology, which has rapidly evolved and extends beyond reconnaissance to precision strikes and logistics support. A specialized branch would enable operators to develop expertise and innovate within this critical field.
Secondly, a separate branch would enhance agility and adaptability, streamlining decision-making and circumventing the parochial interests of other branches that may feel threatened by innovation. Drone operators could respond swiftly to emerging threats without bureaucratic delays.
Historically, new military branches often face resistance from existing ones, which can stifle creativity and protect their resources. The Army’s creation of the Cyber branch in 2014, the Special Forces branch in 1987, and the Aviation branch in 1983, as well as the establishment of the Space Force, illustrate the need for new branches to foster innovation and address emerging threats.
Third, establishing a drone operator branch signifies a cultural shift, akin to the adoption of aviation and armor post-World War I. It would signal that innovation is crucial, encouraging a culture of experimentation, risk-taking, and continuous improvement.
Lastly, a drone branch would provide legislative protection against other entrenched bureaucracies that might seek to marginalize drone programs in the future, ensuring that drone operations remain a priority within the Army.
Relevant articles:
– Unleashing innovation: The case for a drone operator branch in the US Army, Breaking Defense
– US Army Could Soon Have New Branch Dedicated Solely to Drones, The Defense Post
– The Crucial Role of Army Drone Pilots in Modern Warfare, AV8 Prep
– The Future of Army Drone Pilots and Autonomous Systems, AV8 Prep