
The saga of the A-12 Avenger II, a program mired in controversy and failure, remains a stark example of the risks inherent in ambitious defense projects.

Despite an initial budget of approximately $5 billion, the proposed attack aircraft never made it off the drafting board and into production, ultimately culminating in its termination by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney in 1991.

The A-12 Avenger II devised as a replacement for the aging Grumman A-6 Intruder, sought to harness cutting-edge stealth technology. The U.S. Navy had high hopes for the aircraft, with an initial desire for 620 units, while the Marine Corps and Air Force contemplated orders of 238 and 400 aircraft, respectively.

The aircraft, which garnered the moniker “Flying Dorito” due to its distinctive shape, promised to be a technological marvel. However, the project encountered numerous setbacks, including delays, escalating costs, and weight issues that raised concerns about its viability.

As early as 1983, under the Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) program, the seeds of ambition for the A-12 were sown. The McDonnell Douglas/General Dynamics team was chosen in 1988 to spearhead the program’s development.

However, the project’s momentum quickly waned as the complexity of utilizing composite materials and the aircraft’s weight and maintainability problems became evident.

The program’s ambitious schedule further exacerbated the challenges, with plans for an unrealistically quick design-to-assembly timeline.

By October 1990, the Department of Defense had declared that the contractors could not complete the program as proposed.

The mutual suspicions between General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas, both competitors on the Advanced Tactical Fighter project, added a layer of complexity to the already troubled development process. Each was reluctant to share technological advances that might provide an edge to the other.

Secretary Cheney’s decision to terminate the A-12 project was not taken lightly. In his own words from 1991, he stated, “The A-12 I did terminate.

It was not an easy decision to make because it’s an important requirement that we’re trying to fulfill. But no one could tell me how much the program was going to cost, even just through the full-scale development phase, or when it would be available. And data that had been presented at one point a few months ago turned out to be invalid and inaccurate.”

The aftermath of the project’s cancellation was felt across the military and defense contractor communities.

The Navy was left scrambling for a viable successor to its A-6 jets, while the aerospace industry grappled with the repercussions. The ripple effect also reached the Air Force’s plans to develop a derivative of the A-12 to replace F-111 and F-15E aircraft.

Despite the project’s failure, the A-12’s story is not one of complete loss. A generation of engineers gained invaluable experience in building composite and stealth aircraft, knowledge that would inform the development of the F-22 and F-35.

Additionally, a variant of the F404 engine proposed for the A-12 found a new life in the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.